p. 59 on functionalism

ONE OF THE MOST striking developments in the cultural politics of mid-to-late twentieth-century intellectual practice in the West, and particularly in the U.S., was the rise and at least partial fall of a philosophical doctrine known as functionalism. A term with application in nearly every academic discourse, functionalism has a specific meaning within contemporary analytic philosophy: as proposed by Hilary Putnam and subsequently adopted by other writers, functionalism is a "model of the mind" according to which «psychological states (believing that p,' "desiring that p,' 'consider-ing whether p,' etc.) are simply 'computational states of the brain. The proper way to think of the brain is as a digital computer." This is not simply a metaphor: "according to the version of functionalism that I originally proposed, mental states can be defined in terms of Turing machine states and loadings of the memory (the paper tape of the Turing machine)" (Putnam 1988, 73). Many of its advocates give this view the straightforward name
"the computer model of the mind" (e.g., Block 1990; Schank 1973). According to functionalism, the brain just is a digital computer, or something similar enough to one such that if we could discern its physical structure in sufficient detail, we would discover a binary mechanism, probably electrochemical in nature, that constitutes mental representations, exactly as a computer can be said to create representations.

Today, what we might call orthodox functionalism no longer holds sway in analytic philosophy, although its influence has also not vanished.